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Abstract
This paper critically discusses recent objections that have been raised against the contextual
understanding of fundamental physical objects advocated by non-eliminative ontic structural
realism. One of these recent objections claims that such a purely relational understanding
of objects cannot account for there being a determinate number of them. A more general
objection concerns a well-known circularity threat: relations presuppose the objects they relate
and so cannot account for them. A similar circularity objection has also been raised within
the framework of the weak discernibility claims made in the last few years about quantum
particles. We argue that these objections rely either on mere metaphysical prejudice or on
confusing the logico-mathematical formalism within which a physical theory is formulated with
the physical theory itself. Furthermore, we defend the motivations for taking numerical diversity
as a primitive fact in this context.
1 Introduction: OSR and contextual identity
Ontic structural realism (OSR) is a recently much debated conception in the metaphysics of con-
temporary fundamental physics. In this context, it aims to provide an interpretative and ontological
framework that accounts for the crucial features of fundamental physics. The ontological thesis of
OSR can be broadly expressed in the following way: what there is in the world at the fundamental
level (or in the cases where OSR is relevant) are physical structures, in the sense of networks of
concrete physical relations among concrete physical objects (relata). Of course much hinges on the
exact relationship between the objects (relata) and the relations in the structures.
The original version of OSR as developed by French and Ladyman (2003) suggests a purely
relational, ‘object-free’ understanding of structures. Such alleged elimination of objects in funda-
mental ontology has provoked the major objection against this radical (eliminativist) version of
OSR, namely that in repudiating objects, it is hardly intelligible as a metaphysical conception of
the concrete physical world (see e.g. Chakravartty 2003).1 In the face of this objection, efforts
have been deployed in order to articulate some relational (thin) notion of objects (relata) in the
structures to which OSR is committed. In this context, the relational nature of the objects (re-
lata) is characterized in terms of ontological primacy and ontological dependence, giving rise to
the two non-eliminativist variants of OSR (see the recent discussion and the references in French
2010, which still defends the radical, eliminativist version): either no ontological priority between
relations and objects standing in relations (symmetric ontological dependence) or ontological pri-
macy of relations over objects standing in relations (asymmetric ontological dependence of objects
on relations, the objects being constituted by the relations in which they stand). We have argued
1Bain (2013) recently suggests that category theory provides a formal framework for this radical version of OSR;
see Lam and Wu¨thrich (2014) for a critical perspective.
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elsewhere that these characterizations might not be entirely satisfactory (Esfeld and Lam 2011):
the distinction between objects and relations might be best regarded as purely conceptual rather
than ontological, as usually assumed, so that relations (structures) can be understood as the ways
(modes) in which objects exist, without being considered as ontologically distinct from objects.2
Beyond these (important) ontological subtleties, the crucial point for the OSR thesis is that
fundamental physical objects (in the cases where OSR is relevant) do not exist apart from the
physical structures they are part of and in particular do not possess any intrinsic physical identity,
that is, any (qualitative) identity that is independent of concrete relations the physical objects
in question enter into. In broad terms, ‘physical identity’ is the qualitative identity that can be
ascribed to physical objects on the basis of the physical description provided by the relevant physical
theory. It has to be clearly distinguished from the purely formal (logical, set-theoretic) notion of
identity, which the just mentioned physical descriptions make use of. This distinction between the
physical and formal notions of identity is central to the aim of this paper (see below).
In positive terms, the very existence of the OSR objects is relational (structural, contextual—
we use these words interchangeably, as capturing the same idea here), in the sense that their very
existence depends on the relations in which they stand (the structures they are part of) and on
there being other objects (see French 2010 for a discussion of the relevant notion of ‘existential
dependence’ in this context; see also recently Wolff 2012 and McKenzie 2013).3 This broad char-
acterisation of OSR actually encompasses a family of distinct metaphysical theses about identity,
individuality and discernibility. These various specific theses disagree about whether facts about
identity and individuality can be reduced to qualitative facts only and whether objecthood implies
qualitative discernibility (and if yes, what kind of discernibility). We will address some of these
issues in more details below, the important point for now is that, to the extent that they involve a
relational understanding of objects, these different metaphysical theses fall under the OSR umbrella
(see Caulton and Butterfield 2012a, §5.3 for a recent discussion of the links between these various
theses and structuralism).
It has been argued that the ontological thesis of OSR is vindicated by fundamental aspects of
our current best physical theories about matter (quantum theory, including quantum field theory)
and spacetime (general relativity):4 indeed, the fundamental quantum features of permutation in-
variance and quantum entanglement (or, more generally, quantum non-locality), as well as the fun-
damental general relativistic features of gauge-theoretic diffeomorphism invariance and background
independence have all been taken to suggest all the same conclusion, namely that the fundamental
physical objects (in a broad sense) under consideration (elementary quantum systems, spacetime
2We can draw on Spinoza’s metaphysics in order to make this idea more precise. Following Spinoza’s Ethics, one
can understand properties and relations as modes, that is, concrete, particular ways in which objects are. There is
no ontological distinction between objects and their properties and relations in the sense of modes: the modes are
the way in which the objects exist. Objects do not have any existence in distinction to their ways of existence, and
their ways of existence do not have any existence in distinction to the objects. One can draw a conceptual distinction
between objects and their ways of existence, but not an ontological one, applying to reality.
3This ‘existential dependence’ of the objects on the relations in which they stand (or more precisely on there being
other objects) is nicely encoded in the understanding of relations in terms of ways (modes) in which objects exist.
Within this framework, objects explicitly belong to the fundamental ontology (in contrast to eliminativist, radical
OSR), and are therefore not reduced to mere ‘bundles of relations’ (a conception that might face the ‘relations without
relata’ objection): if relations are the ways (modes) in which objects exist, there is a clear and meaningful sense in
which there are fundamental physical objects in the world—namely, there are objects whose existence depends on
there being other objects (and in this sense, this conception clearly constitutes a non-eliminativist version of OSR,
see Esfeld and Lam 2011), thus avoiding the ‘relations without relata’ objection.
4See e.g. French and Ladyman (2003), Lyre (2004), Rickles (2006), Stachel (2006), Ladyman et al. (2007, ch. 3),
Esfeld and Lam (2008), Kantorovich (2009), Muller (2011), Caulton and Butterfield (2012b), French (2012), Lam
and Esfeld (2012), Lam (2013).
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points or regions) do not have any existence—and in particular not any identity—independently of
the physical structure they are part of (independently of the physical relations they enter into). In
other terms, according to the OSR proponent, fundamental physics suggests that there are physical
structures at the fundamental level that do not require underlying objects possessing an intrinsic
identity. From the OSR perspective, this general ontological claim remains relevant even if one
considers that it does not provide a complete ontology yet, in particular of the quantum domain, as
long as it does not specify precisely how the structures to which fundamental physics is committed
are concretely implemented (that is, as long as the quantum measurement problem is not addressed;
however, against what Esfeld 2013 suggests, the OSR proponent can argue that the fact that OSR
provides a general ontological framework which remains genuine and can be further specified within
the different realist quantum interpretations constitutes a positive and convincing feature of this
conception).
As empirically adequate as it might be, the basis for the ontological framework of (non-
eliminativist) OSR seems however threatened by a general argument that looms in the literature,
a version of which has been recently put forward by Jantzen (2011), where it is argued that “no
version of OSR which both retains objects and understand ‘structure’ in terms of relations can be
successful.” (433) The central claim of Jantzen (2011) is that (non-eliminativist) OSR cannot ac-
count for and even cannot coherently accept the fact that there is a determinate number of objects
(relata) in the physical structures to which OSR is committed at the fundamental level. This paper
aims to critically discuss this claim and its underlying argument, as well as the broader circularity
objection against any relational (structural, contextual) understanding of objects. Furthermore, the
aim is to clarify the ontological status of numerical diversity (plurality) in the physical structures
described by fundamental physics.
The crucial point, which seems to be overlooked in Jantzen’s argument as well as in the general
circularity objection, is the fundamental distinction between the logico-mathematical and the phys-
ical aspects of the OSR structures. The confusions around this point are recurrent in the debates on
OSR, so that it is worth highlighting the issues in some details. To be clear: our aim in this paper is
not to evaluate the physical arguments in favour of OSR or to discuss to what extent it constitutes
an adequate ontology of the physical world as described by fundamental physics. Independently of
one’s stance on OSR as an interpretative framework for fundamental physics, the issues about the
coherence of the relational understanding of objects and about the status of fundamental numerical
diversity are relevant to the debates in the metaphysics of objects in general.
2 The objection from cardinality
The central argument in Jantzen (2011) against (non-eliminativist) OSR mainly relies on two
considerations, one metaphysical and one logical:
(i) The fundamental objects within (non-eliminativist) OSR lack any primitive identity; more
specifically, they lack self-identity.
(ii) The dependence in the standard set-theoretic framework of the notion of cardinality on the
notion of identity.
Within the framework of Jantzen’s argument, (non-eliminativist) OSR is mainly characterized
in terms of the ontological priority of structure over objects, which are “supervenient placeholders
in that structure” (2011, 434). It is then argued that claim (i) encodes the ontological priority
of structure within the framework of this OSR conception of objects: the underlying reasoning is
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that since there is nothing to objects in this context beyond the ontologically prior structure, the
objects cannot possess the non-qualitative and non-structural property (or relation) of self-identity.
More specifically, Jantzen crucially understands (i) in terms of lack of formal identity relations in
the logical or set-theoretical sense.
Claim (ii) is grounded on logical facts; the standard set-theoretic notion of cardinality relies
on the notion of bijection or, more generally, on the notion of function, which in turn presupposes
some notion of self-identity for the set elements. Indeed, the underlying intuition links the notion
of cardinality to the notion of countability (in the finite cases), and this latter to the numerical
distinctness of the considered set elements, which is ultimately based on their (primitive) self-
identity (a set element is numerically distinct—and can be counted—in virtue of being identical
with itself but not with the other set elements).5
Taken together, the claims (i) and (ii) seem to imply that (non-eliminativist) OSR is not com-
patible with there being a determinate number of objects (relata) in the fundamental structures
that OSR is realist about. Indeed, since the objects within (non-eliminativist) OSR lack primitive
identity relations (such as the reflexive relation of being identical with itself), there is no numerical
distinctness among them on the basis of which they could be counted, so that there is no definite
cardinality. This consequence constitutes Jantzen’s objection against (non-eliminativist) OSR: “If
one’s ontology admits objects, it ought to admit determinate numbers of them.” (2011, 439)
3 The broad objection: circularity
Indeed Jantzen’s objection constitutes an aspect of a broader objection against grounding (ac-
counting for) identity and individuality facts in terms of relations only (in other terms, this broad
objection targets the relational understanding of the identity and individuality of objects). This
general objection relies on a well-known circularity threat: the very notions of relation and structure
presuppose some numerical diversity (i.e. facts about how many relata there are, facts about the
numerical identity and the numerical distinction (non-identity) of the relata), and so any attempt
to ground this latter in terms of relations only is bound to be circular.
This circularity threat has been recently much discussed in connection with the notion of weak
discernibility and the related weak version of Leibniz’s Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles
(PII). This latter (or weak PII) allows symmetric irreflexive relations to ground identity and indi-
viduality facts of otherwise qualitatively indiscernible objects, such as similar fermions or similar
bosons, which are said to be only weakly discernible on this purely relational basis (Muller and
Saunders 2008, Muller and Seevinck 2009). The coherence and meaning of weak discernibility
(and of weak PII) are subject to much debate: apart from the worry about genuine qualitative
discernibility itself (see Ladyman and Bigaj 2010), one of the major concerns is indeed circular-
ity. As French and Krause (2006, 170-171) put it, “the worry is that in order to appeal to such
relations, one has already had to individuate the particles which are so related and the numerical
diversity of the particles has been presupposed by the relation which hence cannot account for it.”
Weak discernibility alone cannot ground facts about identity and numerical diversity since it seems
mandatory to presuppose some identity and numerical diversity for the objects in order to apply
the weak discernibility criterion (see also Hawley 2009). Furthermore, from a formal point of view,
5Jantzen (2011) also considers alternative notions of cardinality, such as within the quasi-set theoretic approach,
and argues that they too ultimately rely on identity facts. See Arenhart (2012) and Arenhart and Krause (2013)
for a rebuttal of Jantzen’s objection in the quasi-set theoretic context. For the purpose of this article, we can
restrict ourselves to standard set-theory and the standard (von Neumann), intuitive notion of cardinality described
above—suffice is to note that quasi-set theory may well provide a favourable environment for OSR (Krause 2005).
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it seems that the very fact of considering a domain of elements over which physical variables range
presupposes some numerical diversity in the first place.
More precisely, the circularity concern about weak discernibility and more generally about the
relational understanding of identity and individuality finds its roots at two different (interrelated)
levels—a logical, mathematical level and a metaphysical level. The first is constituted by the
standard set-theoretic background within which all our scientific descriptions are formulated. For
instance, the irreducible quantification over elements in standard first-order logic and more generally
the irreducible reference to the elements of the sets used in the mathematical formulations of
physical theories seem to vindicate the view according to which facts about numerical identity and
diversity of the relata are prior to any (logical, set-theoretic) notion of relation. Indeed, the standard
set-theoretic definition of the notion of (irreflexive) relation (and of the notion of structure) makes
ineliminable reference to the numerical diversity of the set elements involved in the definition. For
instance, the binary (irreflexive) relation on a set S = {a, b} between the elements a, b ∈ S is
defined as the ordered pair (a, b), where the ordered pair (a, b) is defined to be the set {a, {a, b}}.
This set-theoretic definition clearly makes irreducible reference to the numerical diversity of the
elements of the set over which the relation is defined. Therefore, in this set-theoretic perspective,
any attempt to ground the numerical diversity of a set of objects only in terms of the relations
holding among them is bound to be circular. It can be further argued—as Jantzen (2011) does—
that the notion of well-defined numerical diversity (well-defined, determinate cardinality) requires
the notion of self-identity of the considered objects (see above section 2); any relational (contextual)
understanding of the identity of these objects is then bound to be circular too.6
At the metaphysical level, worries about weak discernibility and about the relational under-
standing of identity find their roots in a long (‘atomistic’) tradition, which can be traced back to
Aristotle at least and according to which objects (in particular fundamental physical ones) have
to be something in themselves over and above the relations in which they stand, that is, objects
have to possess some identity independently of there being other objects—some intrinsic identity.
Within such metaphysical framework, any attempt to ground the identity of (fundamental physical)
objects only in terms of the relations holding among them clearly is a non-starter.
4 Mathematical framework and physical theories
However, it must also be clear that the metaphysical framework according to which objects have
to possess some intrinsic identity prior to entering into relations can be coherently rejected. That
is precisely what OSR does, motivated by the evidences coming from fundamental physics. The
fact that OSR and its relational (contextual) understanding of objects and their identity are not
compatible with this ‘atomistic’ framework does not constitute any objection against OSR and the
related notion of identity (that would be a mere prejudice). On the contrary, within the context of
the naturalistic move in metaphysics, the metaphysical framework that can best accommodate our
current fundamental scientific descriptions is to be preferred (and, again, the development of OSR
has been precisely motivated by the novel features described by fundamental physics).
The logical side of the circularity threat to the relational (contextual) understanding of numeri-
cal diversity and identity as well as Jantzen (2011)’s cardinality objection against OSR discussed in
section 2 both rest on a confusion between the broad logico-mathematical framework within which
a physical theory is formulated (e.g. standard set theory) and the physical theory itself.
The OSR conception and its contextual identity thesis are about physical ontology (of some
6As already mentioned above (see footnote 5), the proponent of quasi-set theory argues that determinate cardinality
does not necessarily presuppose self-identity (Arenhart 2012, Arenhart and Krause 2013).
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physical domain where OSR is relevant), i.e. claims about what there is in the physical world (or in
some relevant subsets of it). These latter rely on the physical descriptions provided by the relevant
physical theories, which are of course formulated within the broad logico-mathematical framework
just mentioned. But when aiming at ontological claims, the physically meaningful descriptions
rather than the entire logico-mathematical framework within which they are formulated should be
the centre of focus (‘physically meaningful’ is understood here in a very general way, referring to
what is central to the corresponding physical theories and their account of the empirical data; in
particular, this understanding is neutral with respect to the issue of the ontological relationship
between ‘mathematical’ and ‘physical’ entities). Considerations based on the logico-mathematical
framework alone are therefore inept at producing well-grounded ontological claims about the phys-
ical world as described by fundamental physics.
In particular, Jantzen (2011)’s argument crucially relies on (non-eliminativist) OSR being com-
mitted to rejecting (primitive) logical and set-theoretical (self-)identity relations in the context of
the logico-mathematical characterisation of (non-eliminativist) OSR. Within the formal framework
of standard set theory, the argument then exploits the fact that the very notion of cardinality (in
the standard sense) depends on some (primitive) identity facts (see section 2).
Now, as discussed in the introduction, non-eliminativist OSR is a thesis about physical objects
and structures: more specifically, according to non-eliminativist OSR, fundamental physical objects
(in the cases where OSR is relevant) do not exist apart from the physical structures they are part
of and do not possess any intrinsic physical identity, that is, any (qualitative) identity that is
independent of concrete relations the physical objects in question enter into. In particular, these
OSR objects do not possess intrinsic qualitative features (properties), which could ground some
intrinsic qualitative identity.
The fundamental physical objects (relata), relations and structures OSR is committed to are
described by the relevant fundamental physical theories, which are formulated within the broad
framework of standard set theory (or using set-theoretical and logical tools). This formal framework
(or tools) should however not be confused with the physical theories themselves. To the extent that
talk about identity is meaningful (whether or not it is the case might depend on one’s conception
about identity and possibly on the qualitative discernibility that is available as well—more below),
OSR is committed to physical objects having some relational (contextual) physical identity, as
described by physical relational facts; the corresponding formal expressions make use of the relevant
set-theoretic and logical notions (such as logical self-identity). But these latter alone have no
physical meaning—it is acquired once interpreted within a physical theory. Within the context of a
reductive understanding of identity (according to which identity facts can be reduced to qualitative
facts), ‘physical identity’ is the qualitative identity that can be ascribed to physical objects on
the basis of the physical (qualitative) properties and relations described by the relevant physical
theories (e.g. in terms of physically interpreted predicates). This has to be contrasted with the
purely formal (logical, set-theoretic)—physically uninterpreted—notion of identity, which the just
mentioned physical descriptions make use of.
Therefore, the core OSR thesis of contextual physical identity and lack of intrinsic physical
identity or, more generally, the OSR thesis of contextual existence (see the introduction) does not
commit non-eliminativist OSR to rejecting primitive logical self-identity or strict set-theoretical
identity relations within the logico-mathematical formulation of the relevant physical theories. At
the level of the formal representation of the physical theories under consideration, the formal objects
representing physical objects can (and do) stand in (primitive) logical and set-theoretical identity
relations, and yet the physical objects they represent can (and, in the relevant cases, do) lack
any intrinsic physical identity. In other terms, the thesis of contextual physical identity or lack of
intrinsic physical identity at the level of the physical theories (at the ontological level described
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by the fundamental physical theories) does not imply any lack of formal identity relations at the
level of the formal representation of the physical theories.7 As a consequence, since this implication
constitutes one of its premises, Jantzen (2011)’s argument against non-eliminativist OSR and its
contextual identity thesis does not go through.
To some important extent, the case of the circularity objection to the notion of relational
identity and to the notion of weak discernibility is similar to the case of Jantzen (2011)’s objection
against (non-eliminativist) OSR in that is also relies on some confusions around the distinction
between the logico-mathematical framework within which physical theories are formulated and the
physical theories themselves. It is however a bit less straightforward, and there are a few subtle
(and controversial) aspects that need to be carefully considered.
On the one hand, it is clear that the formal (logical, set-theoretical) representation of an ir-
reflexive physical relation does presuppose some formal numerical diversity. But the point of the
proponents of weak discernibility (and of the proponents of non-eliminativist OSR—they need not
be the same) is that this purely formal fact alone has no implication for the nature of the physical
identity (and individuality) of the described physical elements—in particular, whether it is intrinsic
or not. This latter issue has to be investigated within the relevant physical theory, whose descrip-
tion (e.g. in terms of physically interpreted predicates) can well motivate a relational understanding
of the identity (and individuality) of the physical objects under consideration. In this perspective,
claims about weak discernibility only are metaphysically informative in that they do physically
motivate such a relational understanding (which was not presupposed in any way); in this sense,
these claims are not circular (see Muller and Saunders 2008, §6 against the circularity objection to
their weak discernibility results).
On the other hand, it seems that concrete, physical (irreflexive) relations do presuppose some
physical numerical diversity of the physical objects involved. For there to be physical irreflexive
relations, there must be a plurality of physical objects to be related (two in the case of binary
irreflexive relations)—which is not to say that these relata must have some existence (identity)
independently of the relations in which they stand. To some extent, the point is linked to the
‘relations without relata’ objection to radical, eliminativist OSR (see the introduction): indeed,
the argument according to which concrete, physical (irreflexive) relations require concrete, physical
relata that stand in relations seems to imply some (relevant) numerical diversity for these relata.
Of course, the proponent of radical, eliminativist OSR will reject this implication (as well as the
original argument) as metaphysically prejudiced (French 2010). We do not need to enter this
debate here (apart from the comments made in the introduction); suffice is to note that if the
‘relations without relata’ argument is accepted, then it can be easily argued that claims about weak
discernibility only can hardly account for the physical numerical diversity of the considered objects,
on pain of circularity (a similar consideration can be made about physical numerical diversity within
the framework of non-eliminativist OSR). But this fact does not render weak discernibility or non-
eliminativist OSR circular altogether. Indeed, it has been recently suggested in this relational
context that numerical diversity should be taken as a primitive fact—although this might look
somewhat surprising at first sight. We examine this suggestion in the next section.
7We are not suggesting here that the broad standard mathematical (logical, set-theoretic) framework within which
physical theories are usually formulated is not metaphysically loaded at all—it is to some extent, but mainly once
physically interpreted. In this sense, we don’t think for instance that standard set theory with identity is committed
to an ontology of individuals that possess some primitive intrinsic thisness (represented by the formal primitive self-
identity relation in this context). Therefore, as interesting as it might be on its own right, the motivation (especially
from quantum physics) for quasi-set theory does not appear to us as strong as it is claimed to be. Of course, it might
still be interesting to look for alternative formal frameworks, which could allow physical theories to develop in new
directions.
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5 Primitive numerical diversity and contextual objects
There is a double motivation for accepting numerical diversity as primitive within the framework
of non-eliminativist OSR. First, it obviously dissolves the possible worries around the controversial
issue of the status of numerical diversity in this purely relational context. Second, it enables non-
eliminativist OSR to explicitly free itself from any commitment to PII—while remaining compatible
with it, in particular in its weak version (see Ainsworth 2011 for a discussion of the links between
OSR and PII)—and to allow for contextual but completely indiscernible objects, in the sense of
not even weakly discernible objects.8
At first sight, it might seem surprising to take as primitive facts about numerical diversity (i.e.
facts about numerical identity and distinctness) in the context of the relational understanding of
objects: indeed, primitive numerical diversity runs against the reductive account of identity (and
individuality) in terms of qualitative facts that is usually associated with OSR. Moreover, primitive
numerical diversity is more often associated with the conception according to which every object
possesses the unique non-qualitative intrinsic property of being the object it is (some ‘primitive
thisness’ or ‘haecceity’).
There is however a big difference between primitive numerical diversity in the haecceitistic con-
text (primitive intrinsic diversity or haecceitistic diversity) and primitive numerical diversity in the
OSR context (primitive contextual diversity). The former is a diversity of ‘isolated’ individuals—
individuals in the strong sense of being absolutely discernible (in a non-qualitative way) in virtue
of their haecceitistic properties—possessing some (non-qualitative) intrinsic identity, whereas the
latter is a diversity of what can be called ‘contextual objects’, which have no existence (and no
identity, no individuality) independently of the (actual) structures they are part of. This last point
shows in particular that primitive contextual diversity does not imply haecceitistic differences (it
is meaningless to consider contextual objects independently of the actual qualitative relations they
enter into, independently of the actual qualitative structures they are part of), whereas haecceitistic
diversity does (Ladyman 2007), at least within the general understanding (but see below). Indeed
primitive contextual diversity is more naturally associated with the denial of such haecceitistic
differences, which is in line with fundamental physical features such as general permutation invari-
ance in quantum theory and general relativity (see the introduction and in particular the recent
discussion in Caulton and Butterfield 2012b).
Although primitive contextual diversity is a coherent move for the proponent of the relational
understanding of objects, the very motivation for the contextual aspect of primitive diversity—to
be contrasted with the motivations for the primitive status of contextual diversity above—has been
recently put into question by Dorato and Morganti (2013). There are two main steps in their
argument. First, they argue that a diversity of primitive intrinsic identities (individualities) is as
metaphysically acceptable (from a naturalistic standpoint) as primitive contextual diversity.9 Once
it is explicitly recognised that something must be accepted as primitive, the ‘metaphysical cost’
of primitive intrinsic identities is claimed to be no higher than the ‘cost’ of primitive contextual
8Completely indiscernible objects easily appear in the mathematical domain (see Leitgeb and Ladyman 2008,
who on this basis argue for primitive numerical diversity within mathematical structuralism); whether there are such
physical objects is an open (and controversial) question. In this context, primitive numerical diversity has been
considered in Pooley (2006), Ladyman (2007), Esfeld and Lam (2008, 2011); see also the recent discussion in Caulton
and Butterfield (2012a).
9“We have already argued that primitivists can agree wholeheartedly with reductionists that mysterious, real yet
non-physical, entities should be avoided when providing an account of reality. [. . . ] But then it follows that, exactly
in the same way as the relations of numerical difference emphasised by the contextualists, primitive intrinsic identities
need not be taken to constitute ‘metaphysical additions’ to the qualities of things, and may simply coincide with
fundamental, ungrounded facts about the existence of certain entities” (Dorato and Morganti 2013, 602).
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diversity, since they argue that primitive intrinsic identities do not necessarily entail haecceitistic
differences either. So, primitive intrinsic identities too are compatible with the denial of haecceitistic
differences that is suggested by fundamental physics.
This leads us to the second step of Dorato and Morganti (2013)’s argument: in the case of
non-relativistic quantum mechanics, they argue that the mere fact that a well-defined number of
particles is always presupposed should be ontologically understood as encoding a primitive fact
about the diversity of individuals with (primitive) intrinsic identity. In particular, they discuss the
recent results about the weak discernibility only of quantum particles and argue that these results
presuppose a well-defined cardinality that should be ontologically read in terms of primitive indi-
viduals with intrinsic identity. According to Dorato and Morganti (2013), this primitive diversity
of intrinsic identities that is encoded in the very formalism of non-relativistic quantum mechanics
bypasses the attempts to ground identity and individuality facts using weak discernibility claims
(which moreover face circularity worries): in their perspective, the primitivist move (about intrinsic
identities) is more straightforward (it follows from the very formalism within which non-relativistic
quantum mechanics is expressed), less controversial (it does not face any circularity worries) and
less revisionary (it does not question the ‘atomistic’ tradition) than the weak discernibility claims.
It is interesting to note the analogy between Dorato and Morganti (2013)’s argument for prim-
itive intrinsic identities and Jantzen (2011)’s objection against non-eliminativist OSR (see section
2): in both cases, the fact of there being a definite cardinality of fundamental physical objects—here
quantum particles—is thought to constitute a difficulty for the relational (contextual) understand-
ing of these objects. Whereas the latter argues that non-eliminativist OSR cannot account for such
a definite cardinality, the former claim that the well-defined number of particles in non-relativistic
quantum mechanics is best understood in terms of primitive intrinsic identities rather than in terms
of ‘contextual particles’. We have argued in section 4 that Jantzen (2011)’s objection relies on a
confusion between the logico-mathematical formalism within which a physical theory is formulated
and the physical theory itself. To some extent, Dorato and Morganti (2013)’s argument for primitive
intrinsic identities falls prey to a similar confusion.
Indeed, Dorato and Morganti (2013) argue that non-relativistic quantum mechanics always
presupposes a well-defined number of particles, and that this fact should be taken ontologically
seriously. As we have just seen, this is a defensible move (especially once it is explicitly recognised
that something must be accepted as primitive), at least within non-relativistic quantum mechan-
ics.10 However, they then crucially assume that such a (primitive) determinate numerical diversity
entails a diversity of individuals with (primitive) intrinsic identity. We have argued in this paper
that this entailment does not hold. Indeed, a well-defined number of physical objects does not
entail anything about their (physical) identity being intrinsic or not. The situation is similar to
our critique of Jantzen (2011)’s argument in section 4: a definite cardinality of physical objects
does not entail that these objects possess an intrinsic physical identity merely in virtue of being
represented by set elements that are self-identical.11
Moreover, Dorato and Morganti (2013) explicitly set themselves in the framework of the natu-
ralistic approach to metaphysics. Part of their paper actually aims to show that such a naturalistic
10Dorato and Morganti (2013) restrict their ‘primitivist’ considerations to non-relativistic quantum mechanics,
where the particle number is always well-defined. More generally, they advocate a form of ‘pluralism’ with respect
to identity and individuality, possibly with different approaches at different levels.
11Arenhart and Krause (2013) have recently also highlighted the analogy between Dorato and Morganti (2013) and
Jantzen (2011): both assume that a definite cardinality requires individuals with intrinsic identity. As mentioned
above, using quasi-set-theoretical tools, Arenhart and Krause (2013) further aim to show that the very formal notion
of self-identity is not required for a definite cardinality (see footnote 7 for a comment on this program in relation to
this paper).
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approach is compatible with taking numerical diversity as primitive. As we have seen above, the
proponent of the relational understanding of fundamental physical objects can fully agree with
them on this point. However, the primitive diversity of individuals with intrinsic identity they
advocate in the case of non-relativistic quantum mechanics does not take into account the funda-
mental features of the theory itself (such as permutation invariance and quantum non-locality—see
the introduction). Even if this diversity of primitive intrinsic identities allegedly does not entail
haecceitistic differences, it seems that it is assumed rather independently of the physics after all:
as we have just seen, it does not follow from the mere fact that non-relativistic quantum mechan-
ics always presupposes a well-defined number of particles and it does not take into account the
specific quantum features such as permutation invariance and quantum non-locality.12 The result
can hardly constitute a substantive form of naturalism. By contrast, primitive contextual diversity
explicitly aims to encode the physical features of permutation invariance and quantum non-locality
and is in good harmony with the related results about weak discernibility (as well as with the fact
that non-relativistic quantum mechanics always deals with a well-defined number of particles).
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have defended the coherence of the relational (contextual) understanding of fun-
damental physical objects (e.g. within non-eliminativist OSR)—the coherence of fundamental
physical contextual objects—against objections that have been recently discussed in the literature.
We have argued that these objections rely either on mere metaphysical prejudice or on confusing
the logico-mathematical formalism within which a physical theory is formulated with the physical
theory itself.
Fundamental physical contextual objects possess an existence that is dependent on the physical
structures they are part of; in particular, they do not possess any intrinsic physical identity and
individuality. We have shown that this characterisation of physical contextual objects does not
prevent them from being in determinate number and from being represented by self-identical set
elements (against the cardinality objection of Jantzen 2011). Most importantly, we have argued
that the core theses at the heart of the notion of contextual object (existential dependence on
structure and lack of intrinsic physical identity) do not involve any circularity.
However, we have seen that legitimate circularity concerns may be raised in this framework
if all identity facts, in particular facts about numerical diversity, are thought to be reducible to
qualitative relational and structural aspects only. In this reductive perspective where identity
facts are understood in terms of qualitative (in)discernibility, circularity worries have been lately
much discussed in relation to recent claims about the weak discernibility only of fundamental
physical objects. Whether a throughout reductive account of identity and individuality in terms of
qualitative relations only is coherent remains a controversial issue and depends to some extent on
one’s metaphysical intuition. We have underlined that the relational understanding of objects (such
as within non-eliminativist OSR) is not tied to the reductive account of identity and individuality
and therefore it is not touched by the related controversies.
In particular, we have considered the recent proposal of taking numerical diversity as a prim-
itive fact in the framework of the relational understanding of objects. We have argued that it
is a perfectly valid strategy in this relational framework and, most importantly, that it does not
make ‘good old’ primitivism about the intrinsic identity and individuality of fundamental physical
12Dorato and Morganti (2013, §6) claim that the suggested diversity of primitive intrinsic identities is compatible
with the results about weak discernibility (since all particles are qualitatively identical); however, the former is
assumed quite independently of the latter.
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objects (in particular non-relativistic quantum particles) preferable (against Dorato and Morganti
2013): indeed, the primitive contextual diversity of quantum particles (for instance) aims to encode
the relational aspects suggested by fundamental quantum features such as permutation invariance
and quantum non-locality (entanglement), whereas primitive intrinsic identities can be postulated
independently of these fundamental physical features (so that the former seems more in line with
the naturalistic approach to metaphysics). More generally, we hope to have shown that the rela-
tional (contextual) understanding of fundamental physical objects (such as within non-eliminativist
OSR) is a coherent metaphysical conception, so one should stop worrying about this structural
metaphysics. Rather one should focus on further evaluating its interpretative merits—beyond the
many encouraging signs—with respect to the arguments coming from fundamental physics.
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